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1 Introduction
Consider the allotment problem faced by a group of agents who may share a homogeneous
and perfectly divisible good, available only in whole units. Examples of this kind of good
are shares representing ownership of a company, bonds issued by a company to nance
its business operations, treasury bills issued by the government to nance its short term
needs, or any type of nancial assets with (potentially large) face values or tickets of
a lottery. Agentsrisk attitudes and wealth induce single-peaked preferences on their
potential allotments of the good, the set of non-negative real numbers. A solution of the
problem is a rule that selects, for each prole (of agentspreferences), a non-negative
integer number of units of the good to be allotted and a vector of allotments (a list
of non-negative real numbers, one for each agent) whose sum is equal to this integer.
Observe that although the good is only available in integer amounts agentsallotments
are allowed to take non-integer values; yet, their sum has to be an integer. Namely,
in the above examples agents are able to share a nancial asset or a lottery ticket by
getting portions of it. But, for most proles, the sum of agentsbest allotments will
be either larger or smaller than any integer number and hence, an endogenous rationing
problem emerges, positive or negative depending on whether the chosen integer is smaller
or larger than the sum of agentsbest allotments. Sprumont (1991) studied the problem
when the amount of the good to be allotted is xed. He characterized the uniform rule as
the unique e¢ cient, strategy-proof and anonymous rule on the domain of single-peaked
preferences. The present paper can be seen as an extension of Sprumont (1991)s paper
to a setting where the amount to be allotted of a perfectly divisible good has to be an
integer, which may depend on agentspreferences.
We are interested in situations where the good is freely available to agents, but only
in whole units. Hence, an agent will not accept a proposal of an allotment that is strictly
worse than any integer amount of the good. For an agent with a (continuous) single-
peaked preference, the set of allotments that are at least as good as any integer amount
of the good (the set of individually rational allotments) is a closed interval that contains
the best allotment, that we call the peak, and at least one of the two extremes of the
interval is an integer. If preferences are symmetric, the peak is at the midpoint of the
interval.
Our main concern then is to identify rules that select, for each prole of agents
symmetric single-peaked preferences, a vector of individually rational allotments. We
call such rules individually rational. But since the set of individually rational rules is
extremely large, and some of them are arbitrary and non-interesting, we would like to
focus further on rules that are also e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and satisfy some minimal
2
fairness requirement. A rule is e¢ cient if it selects, at each prole, a Pareto optimal
vector of allotments: no other choices of (i) integer unit of the good to be allotted or
(ii) vector of allotments, or (iii) both, can make all agents better o¤, and at least one
of them strictly better o¤. We characterize the class of all e¢ cient rules by means of
two properties. First, the allotted amount of the good is the closest integer to the sum
of agentspeaks. Second, all agents are rationed in the same direction: all receive more
than their peaks, if the integer to be allotted is larger than the sum of the peaks, or all
receive less, otherwise. A rule is strategy-proof if it induces, at each prole, truth-telling
as a weakly dominant strategy in its associated direct revelation game. Our fairness
requirements will be related to two alternative and well-known notions of envy-freeness,
that we will adapt to our setting (justied envy-freeness on losses and envy-freeness on
awards).1
We rst show that there is no rule that is simultaneously e¢ cient and strategy-
proof on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.2 We then proceed by
studying separately two subclasses of rules on the symmetric single-peaked domain;
those that are individually rational and e¢ cient and those that are individually rational
and strategy-proof. For the rst subclass, we identify the constrained equal losses rule
and the constrained equal awards rule as the unique rules that, in addition of being
individually rational and e¢ cient, satisfy also either justied envy-freeness on losses or
envy-freeness on awards, respectively. These rules divide the e¢ cient integer amount
of the good in such a way that all agents experience either equal losses or equal gains,
subject to the constraint that all allotments have to be individually rational. Specically,
the constrained equal losses rule, evaluated at a prole, selects rst the e¢ cient number of
integer units. Then, to allot this integer amount it proceeds with the rationing from the
vector of peaks, by either reducing or increasing the allotment of each agent (depending
on whether the sum of the peaks is larger or smaller than the integer amount to be
allotted) until the total amount is allotted. However, it makes sure that the extremes
of agentsindividually rational intervals are not overcome by excluding any agent from
the rationing process as soon as one of the extremes of the agents individually rational
interval is reached, and it continues with the rest. The constrained equal awards rule is
1See Section 3 for their denitions and justications, and Thomson (2010) for a survey on envy-
freeness.
2This is in contrast with Sprumont (1991)s setting, which admits an extremely large class of e¢ cient
and strategy-proof rules, even on the larger domain of single-peaked preferences. See Barberà, Jackson
and Neme (1997) for a characterization of the set of sequential allotment rules as the class of all e¢ cient,
strategy-proof and replacement monotonic rules. To our knowledge this is the largest subclass of e¢ cient
and strategy-proof rules characterized so far on the domain of single-peaked preferences.
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dened similarly but instead it uses, as the starting vector of the rationing process, either
the vector of lower bounds or the vector of upper bounds of the individually rational
intervals, depending on whether the sum of the peaks is larger or smaller than the integer
amount to be allotted, but makes sure that no agents peak is overcome by excluding
her from the rationing process as soon as her peak is reached, and it continues with the
rest.
For the subclass of individually rational and strategy-proof rules, we show in contrast
that although there are many rules satisfying the two properties simultaneously, they
are not very interesting; for instance, none of them is unanimous. A rule is unanimous
if, whenever the sum of the peaks is an integer, the rule selects this integer and it
allots it according to the agentspeaks. We show then that individual rationality and
strategy-proofness are indeed incompatible with unanimity.
At the end of the paper we extend some of our general and possibility results to the
case where agents single-peaked preferences are not necessarily symmetric. We argue
why relevant strategy-proof rules in the classical division problem (i.e., the uniform
rule and all sequential dictator rules) are not satisfactory in our setting. In particular,
we show rst that the (extended) uniform rule is e¢ cient on the domain of all single-
peaked preference proles but it is neither strategy-proof nor individually rational, even
on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preference proles.3 Finally, we show that
all sequential dictator rules are e¢ cient on the domain of all symmetric single-peaked
preference proles but they are neither individually rational nor strategy-proof, even on
this subdomain.4
Before nishing this Introduction we mention some of the most related papers to
ours. As we have already said, Sprumont (1991) proposed the division problem of a
xed amount of a good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on
3The extended uniform rule allots, at each prole, the e¢ cient integer amount as the uniform rule
would do it. It is not strategy-proof because an agent may have incentives to misreport his preferences
to induce a di¤erent choice of the integer amount, and it is not individually rational because the vector
of allotments selected by the uniform rule is not individually rational in general. However, the adapted
version proposed in Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2015) satises individual rationality but it remains
manipulable.
4A sequential dictator rule, given a pre-specied order on the set of agents, proceeds by letting
agents choose sequentially their peaks, rationing only the last agent whose allotment is the remainder
amount that ensures that the sum of the allotments is equal to the e¢ cient integer amount. Sequential
dictator rules are not strategy-proof because the agent at the end of the ordering may have incentives
to misreport her preference to induce a di¤erent amount to allot. They are not individually rational
because the agent at the end of the ordering is rationed independently of her individually rational
interval.
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their potential allotments and provided two characterizations of the uniform rule, using
strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency and either anonymity or envy-freeness. Then, a very large
literature followed Sprumont (1991) by taking at least two di¤erent paths. The rst
contains papers providing alternative characterizations of the uniform rule. See for in-
stance Ching (1994), Sönmez (1994) and Thomson (1994a, 1994b, 1995 and 1997), whose
characterizations we briey discuss in the last section of the paper. The second group of
papers proposed alternative rules when the problem is modied by introducing additional
features or considering alternative domains of agentspreferences, or both. For instance,
Ching (1992) extended the characterization of Sprumont (using envy-freeness) to the
domain of single-plateaud preference proles and Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2012a,
2012b and 2015), Manjunath (2012) and Kim, Bergantiños and Chun (2015) study alter-
native ways of introducing individual rationality in the division problem. But in contrast
with the present paper they assume that the quantity of the good to be allotted is xed.
Adachi (2010), Amorós (2002), Anno and Sasaki (2013), Cho and Thomson (2013), Er-
lanson and Flores-Szwagrzak (2015) and Morimoto, Serizawa and Ching (2013) contain
the multi-dimensional analysis of the division problem when several commodities have
to be allotted among the same group of agents, but again the quantities of the goods to
be allotted are xed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the problem, preliminary
notation and basic denitions. Section 3 contains the denitions of the properties of
the rules that we will be concerned with. Section 4 describes the rules and states a
preliminary result. Section 5 contains the main results of the paper for symmetric single-
peaked preferences. Section 6 contains two nal remarks.
2 The problem
We study situations where each agent of a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng wants an amount
of a perfectly divisible good that can only be obtained in integer units, but arbitrary
portions of each unit can be freely allotted. We assume that n  2 and denote by xi  0
the total amount of the good allotted to agent i 2 N: Since all units of the good are
alike, the amount xi may come from di¤erent units. We assume that there is no limit
on the (integer) number of units that can be allotted. Hence, and once N is xed, the
set of feasible (vector of) allotments is
FA = fx = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 RN+ j
P
i2N xi 2 N0g;
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where R+ = [0;+1) is the set of non-negative real numbers and N0 = f0; 1; 2; : : :g is
the set of non-negative integers.5
Each agent i has a preference relation i, dened on the set of potential allotments,
which is a complete and transitive binary relation on R+. That is, for all xi; yi; zi 2
R+; either xi i yi or yi i xi; and xi i yi and yi i zi imply xi i zi; note that
reexivity (xi i xi for all xi 2 R+) is implied by completeness. Given i, let i be the
antisymmetric binary relation on R+ induced by i (i.e., for all xi; yi 2 R+, xi i yi if
and only if yi  xi does not hold) and let i be the indi¤erence relation on R+ induced
by i (i.e., for all xi; yi 2 R+, xi i yi if and only if xi i yi and yi i xi). We
assume that i is continuous (i.e., for each xi 2 R+ the sets fyi 2 R+ j yi i xig and
fyi 2 R+ j xi i yig are closed) and that i is single-peaked on R+; namely, there exists
a unique pi 2 R+, the peak of i, such that pi i xi for all xi 2 R+nfpig and xi i yi
holds for any pair of allotments xi; yi 2 R+ such that either yi < xi  pi or pi  xi < yi.
For each i 2 N; let pii be an agent is single-peaked preference such that pi 2 R+ is
the peak of pii : We say that agent is single-peaked preference i is symmetric on R+
if for all zi 2 [0; pi], (pi   zi) i (pi + zi) ; that is, for all xi; yi 2 R+; xi i yi if and
only if jpi   xij  jpi   yij : Notice two things. First, the peak of a symmetric single-
peaked preference conveys all information about the whole preference. Thus, we will
often identify a symmetric single-peaked preference i with its peak pi. Second, for each
xi 2 R+ there exists a unique integer kxi 2 N0 such that kxi  xi < kxi + 1: Hence, the
following notation is well-dened:
bxic = kxi
dxie = kxi + 1; and
[xi] =
(
kxi if xi  kxi + 0:5
kxi + 1 if xi > kxi + 0:5:
In particular, [xi] is the integer closest to xi (if it is unique) and [xi] = kxi if xi =
2kxi+1
2
:
A (division) problem is a pair (N;) whereN is the set of agents and= (1; : : : ;n)
is a prole of single-peaked preferences on R+, one for each agent in N . Since the set
N will remain xed we often write  instead of (N;) and refer to  as a problem and
as a prole, interchangeably. To emphasize agent is preference i in the prole  we
often write it as (i; i):
We denote by P the set of all problems and by PS the set of all problems where
agentspreferences are symmetric single-peaked.
5Since no confusion can arise with negative integers, we will refer to the set of non-negative integers
N0 as the set of integers.
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Since preferences are idiosyncratic, they have to be elicited. A rule on P is a function
f assigning to each problem 2 P a feasible allotment f () = (f1 () ; : : : ; fn()) 2
FA: We will also consider rules dened only on PS: Any rule on P can be restricted to
operate only on PS:
To study rules on PS selecting individually rational allotments, the following intervals
will play a critical role. Fix a problem 2 PS; with its vector of peaks (p1; : : : ; pn). For
each i 2 N; dene the associated interval
[li(pi); ui (pi)] =
(
[bpic ; pi + (pi   bpic)] if [pi] = bpic
[pi   (dpie   pi) ; dpie] if [pi] = dpie :
When no confusion arises we write li instead of li(pi) and ui instead of ui (pi) :
Allotments outside the interval [li; ui] are strictly worse to some integer allotment
(either to bpic or to dpie), and they will not be acceptable to i; if agent i has free access
to any integer amount of the good. Since each interval [li; ui] depends only on pi; we call
it the individually rational interval of pi (Proposition 2 will show the exact relationship
between individually rational rules on PS and the individually rational intervals). Given
pi 2 R+; [li; ui] can be seen as the unique interval with the properties that pi is equidistant
to the two extremes (i.e. pi = li+ui2 ), at least one of the two extremes is an integer, and
its length is at most one. For instance, the individually rational interval of pi = 1:8 is
[1:6; 2] and of pi = 2:3 is [2; 2:6]:
3 Properties of rules
We now describe possible properties that a rule f on P (or on PS) may satisfy. Again,
the properties dened on P can be straightforwardly extended to PS by restricting their
denitions to the set of problems in PS:
We start with the property of individual rationality, the one that we found more
basic for the class of problems we are interested in, which is the main focus of this paper.
Since we are assuming that all integer units of the good are freely available, even for a
single agent, a rule is individually rational if each agent considers her allotment at least
as good as any integer number of units of the good.
Individual rationality. For all 2 P, i 2 N and k 2 N0, fi () i k:
The next two properties are also appealing. E¢ ciency says that, for each problem,
the vector of allotments selected by the rule is Pareto undominated in the set of feasible
allotments, while a rule is strategy-proof if agents can never obtain a strictly better
allotment by misrepresenting their preferences.
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E¢ ciency. For all 2 P, there does not exist y 2 FA such that yi i fi() for all i 2 N
and yj  fj() for at least one j 2 N:
Strategy-proofness. For all 2 P ; i 2 N and single-peaked preference 0i,
fi () i fi (0i; i) :
We say that agent i manipulates f at  via 0i if fi (0i; i) i fi ().
We will also consider other desirable properties of rules. Participation says that
agents will not have interest in obtaining integer units of the good in addition to their
received allotments. To dene it formally, we need some additional notation. For each
2 P, i 2 N and k 2 N0 such that k  pi; let pi ki be the single-peaked preference
on R+ obtained from i by shifting it downwards in k units; namely, for each pair
xi; yi 2 R+; xi pi ki yi if and only if k + xi i k + yi.
Participation. For all 2 P, i 2 N and k 2 N0 such that k  pi;
fi() = k + fi(pi ki ; i):
Unanimity says that the rule selects the prole of peaks whenever it is a feasible vector
of allotments. Equal treatment of equals says that agents with the same preferences
receive equal allotments.
Unanimity. For all 2 P such that Pj2N pj 2 N0; fi () = pi for all i 2 N:
Equal treatment of equals. For all 2 P and i; j 2 N such that i=j; fi () = fj () :
Envy-freeness says that the rule selects a vector of allotments with the property that
no agent would strictly prefer the allotment of another agent.
Envy-freeness. For all 2 P and i; j 2 N , fi () i fj () :
The next three properties are alternative versions of envy-freeness, adapted to our
context when agents have symmetric single-peaked preferences and they have free access
to any integer amount of the good. Given that, each agent is willing to accept a non-
integer allotment proposed by the rule insofar her participation in the problem helps her
to circumvent the integer restriction. Hence, envy-freeness may take as reference, not
the absolute amounts received but instead, how other agents are treated with respect to
their peaks or to their individually rational intervals. The emphasis is then on either the
losses or the awards that agentsallotments represent with respect to either their peaks
or the extremes of their individually rational intervals, respectively. First, envy-freeness
on losses says that each agent prefers her loss (with respect to her peak) to the loss of
any other agent.
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Envy-freeness on losses. For all2 PS and i; j 2 N , fi() i max fpi + (fj ()  pj); 0g :6
Second, justied envy-freeness on losses qualies the previous property by requiring
that each agent i prefers his loss (i.e., fi ()  pi) to the loss of any other agent j (i.e.,
fj ()   pj), only if js allotment is strictly preferred by j to any integer. Since agents
can obtain freely any integer number of units of the good, it may be understood that
it is not legitimate for i to express envy against another agent j who is receiving an
allotment that j considers indi¤erent to an integer because it is as if the rule would not
allot to j any amount. Hence, is envy towards j is only justied if j strictly prefers her
allotment to any integer amount.
Justied envy-freeness on losses. For all 2 PS and i; j 2 N such that fj() j k for
all k 2 N0, fi () i max fpi + (fj ()  pj); 0g :
Envy-freeness on awards roughly says that each agent prefers her award, with respect
to her individually rational allotment, to any amount between her award and the award
of any other agent. To state it formally, let f be a rule on PS. Dene, for each 2 PS
and i 2 N , the award of i (at (; f)) with respect to is individually rational interval as
ai (; f) =
(
fi ()  li if fi ()  pi
ui   fi () if fi () > pi:
When no confusion arises we write ai instead of ai (; f) :
Envy-freeness on awards. For all 2 PS and i; j 2 N ,
x 2 [min fai (; f) ; aj (; f)g ;max fai (; f) ; aj (; f)g]
implies fi () i li + x.7
To see why envy-freeness on awards is a desirable property consider for example the
case where ai (; f) = fi() li; aj (; f) = fj() lj and ai < x < aj: If li+x i fi();
i may argue that the non-integer amount received by j was too large and that there is
a compromise, x 2 [ai; aj], that may be used to solve the integer problem in a more fair
way. Example 1 might also help to better understand this property.
6Note that fi () = pi + (fi ()  pi) always holds; hence, the condition in the denition is trivially
satised whenever i = j:
Since pi+ (fj ()  pj) < 0 is possible we consider the max because preferences are only dened over
non negative allotments.
7For all such x; fi () i li + x is equivalent to fi () i ui   x since i is symmetric single-peaked
and, by the denition of the extremes of the individually rational interval, pi = li+ui2 :
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Example 1 Consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where N = f1; 2; 3g, p = (0:1; 0:6; 0:6)
and assume the rule f is such that f() = (0; 0:5; 0:5): Agent 1 is not envying agent 2
since 0 0:11 0:5: Note that l1 = 0, l2 = 0:2; a1 (; f) = 0; and a2 (; f) = 0:3. Hence,
[min fa1 (; f) ; a2 (; f)g ;max fa1 (; f) ; a2 (; f)g] = [0; 0:3]:
By setting x = 0:3 we have that f1() = 0 0:11 0:3 = l1 + x: Nevertheless, by setting
x = 0:1 we have that f1() = 0 0:11 0:1 = l1+x, and so f would not satisfy envy-freeness
on awards. In this case agent 1 can argue that agent 2 is receiving at f() (compared
with the individually rational points l2 = 0:2 and l1 = 0) more than her (a2 = 0:3 versus
a1 = 0). 
Again, envy-freeness is based on absolute references: it requires comparisons of allot-
ments directly. In contrast, our two notions of envy-freeness are relative: they disregard
the integer amounts allotted to the agents and compare (using losses or awards as refer-
ences) only those fractions received away from the peaks or the relevant extremes of the
individually rational intervals.
Finally, group rationality is an extension of individual rationality to groups of agents.
It says that each subset of agents receives a total allotment that is (in aggregate terms)
at least as good asany other total allotment they could receive only by themselves.
Group rationality. For all 2 PS, S  N and k 2 N0,P
i2S pi  
P
i2S fi ()
  Pi2S pi   k :
Remark 1 The following statements hold.8
(R1.1) If f is e¢ cient on P, then f is unanimous.
(R1.2) If f is envy-free on losses on PS, then f satises justied envy-freeness on losses
on PS.
(R1.3) If f is group rational on PS, then f is individually rational on PS.
4 Rules
In this section we adapt, to our setting with endogenous integer amounts, fair and well-
known rules that have already been used to solve the division problem with a xed
amount. Since our main results will be relative to symmetric single-peaked preferences,
we already restrict the rules we consider in the next two sections to operate on PS. This
8The proofs that (R1.1), (R1.2) and (R1.3) hold are immediate.
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is important because the rules will allot the integer amount that is closest to the sum
of the peaks, which is always the e¢ cient amount only if single-peaked preferences are
symmetric. Although we will be interested only on their constrained versions (to ensure
that they are individually rational) we also present their unconstrained versions for fur-
ther reference and because they may help the reader to understand the constrained ones.
The rst one is the equal losses rule fEL. At any prole, fEL selects the feasible vector
of allotments by the following egalitarian procedure. Start from the vector of peaks and,
if this is an unfeasible vector of allotments, increase (or decrease) all agentsallotments
in the same amount until the integer [
P
j2N pj] is allotted, stopping the decrease (if this
is the case) of any agents allotment, as soon as the zero allotment is reached.
Equal losses
 
fEL

. For all 2 PS and i 2 N; set
fELi () =
(
pi  min f; pig if
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj]
pi +  if
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj];
where  is the unique real number for which
P
j2N f
EL
j () = [
P
j2N pj] holds.
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Figure 1 represents fEL at the proles ; 0 and ; where p1 + p2 = p01 + p02 >
[p1 + p2] = [p
0
1 + p
0
2] and p1 + p2 < [p1 + p2]:
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Figure 1
9Corollary 1 below (that follows from Proposition 1) will establish the existence of such unique real
number , as well as the existence of the real numbers b, , and b, used to dene the other three rules
below.
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The constrained equal losses rule fCEL proceeds by following the same egalitarian
procedure but now the increase or decrease of the allotment of agent i; starting from pi;
stops as soon as is allotment is equal to the relevant extreme of is individually rational
interval.
Constrained equal losses (fCEL). For all 2 PS and i 2 N; set
fCELi () =
(
pi  min fb; pi   lig if Pj2N pj  [Pj2N pj]
pi +min fb; ui   pig if Pj2N pj < [Pj2N pj];
where b is the unique real number for whichPj2N fCELj () = [Pj2N pj] holds.
Figure 2 represents fCEL at the proles  and ; where p1 + p2 > [p1 + p2] and
p1 + p2 < [p1 + p2]:
-
6
-
6
q q q
r r
q
q
q r
r
q	  	   
 

6
(p1; p2) (p1; p2)
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
[p1 + p2] + 1
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l2 q
q
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qqu2
q
u1
fCEL()
fCEL( )
?
Figure 2
The equal awards rule fEA follows the same egalitarian procedure used to dene fEL;
but instead of starting from the vector of peaks, it starts from the vector of relevant
extremes of the individually rational intervals and, it increases (or decreases) all agents
allotments in the same amount until the integer number of units [
P
j2N pj] is allotted,
making sure that no agent receives a negative allotment.
Equal awards
 
fEA

. For all 2 PS and i 2 N; set
fEAi () =
(
li +  if
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj]
ui  minf; uig if
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj];
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where  is the unique real number for which
P
j2N f
EA
j () = [
P
j2N pj] holds.
Figure 3 represents fEA at the proles ; 0 and ; where p1 + p2 > [p1 + p2],
p01 + p
0
2 < [p
0
1 + p
0
2], p1 + p2 < [p1 + p2] and [p
0
1 + p
0
2] = [p1 + p2]:
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0
2) (u1; u2)
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fEA()
fEA( )
fEA(0)
Figure 3
The constrained equal awards rule fCEA proceeds by following the same egalitarian
procedure used to describe fEA; but now the increase or decrease of the allotment of
each agent i; starting from the relevant extreme of is individually rational interval, stops
as soon as is allotment is equal to pi.
Constrained equal awards fCEA. For all 2 PS and i 2 N; set
fCEAi () =
(
li +minfb; pi   lig if Pj2N pj  [Pj2N pj]
ui  minfb; ui   pig if Pj2N pj < [Pj2N pj];
where b is the unique real number for whichPj2N fCEAj () = [Pj2N pj] holds.
Figure 4 represents fCEA at the proles  and ; where p1 + p2 > [p1 + p2] and
p1 + p2 < [p1 + p2]:
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The existence of the unique numbers , b,  and b in each of the above denitions
is guaranteed by Proposition 1 below. The translation of its content at the gures
representing the four rules is as follows. Conditions (P1.1) and (P1.2) guarantee that
the vector of lower bounds l = (l1; : : : ; ln) and the vector of upper bounds u = (u1; : : : ; un)
lie respectively below and above the hyperplane fy 2 RN+ j
P
j2N yj = [
P
j2N pj]g.10
Proposition 1 For each 2 PS, the relevant statement below holds.
(P1.1) If
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] then
P
j2N lj  [
P
j2N pj]:
(P1.2) If
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj] then
P
j2N uj  [
P
j2N pj]:
Proof Let 2 PS be arbitrary.
(P1.1) Assume
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] holds. To obtain a contradiction supposeP
j2N lj > [
P
j2N pj]: (1)
For all i 2 N; li  pi: Then, there exists at least one i such that li < pi; otherwise, if
for all j 2 N; lj = pj holds, then pj 2 N0 for all j 2 N; and (1) could not hold. Hence,
by the denition of [
P
j2N pj]; and since li  pi for all i 2 N and
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj];
there exists k 2 N0 such that
k = [
P
j2N pj] <
P
j2N lj <
P
j2N pj  k + 0:5: (2)
10It is immediate to see that (i) if
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj ] then
P
j2N uj  [
P
j2N pj ] and (ii) ifP
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj ] then
P
j2N lj < [
P
j2N pj ]:
14
For each i 2 N there exists ki 2 N0 such that ki  li  pi < ki+1: To see that note that
given pi 2 [li; ui] either li 2 N0 or ui 2 N0 and so, if li 2 N0 then li = ki and if ui 2 N0
then ui = ki + 1: Consider the symmetric single-peaked preference pi kii and let l0i and
p0i be the corresponding lower bound and peak associated with pi kii : Thus, l0i = li  ki
and p0i = pi   ki: Note that 0  p0i < 1: It is easy to see that the three equalities below
[
P
j2N pj] =
P
j2N kj + [
P
j2N p
0
j];P
j2N lj =
P
j2N kj +
P
j2N l
0
j; andP
j2N pj =
P
j2N kj +
P
j2N p
0
j
hold. Let k0 = k  Pj2N kj: Then, by (2) and the equalities above,
k0 = [
P
j2N p
0
j] <
P
j2N l
0
j <
P
j2N p
0
j  k0 + 0:5:
Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that 0  pi < 1 for all i 2 N: Let
S = fi 2 N j li = 0g. Observe that if i =2 S, li < pi and ui = 1: Thus,
k = [
P
j2N pj] <
P
j2N lj =
P
j2NnS lj <
P
j2NnS pj 
P
j2N pj  k + 0:5:
Hence, [
P
j2NnS pj] = k; and so we can also assume that li > 0 for all i 2 N: Since
0 < pi < 1; li < pi, and ui = 1; we have that
P
j2N pj < n: Then, k  n   1. Besides,P
j2N uj = n: By (2),
P
j2N (pj   lj) < 0:5: Since, by symmetry, pi   li = ui   pi for
all i 2 N; Pj2N (uj   pj) =Pj2N (pj   lj) < 0:5: But since, by (2), Pj2N pj  k + 0:5
holds,
n =
P
j2N uj =
P
j2N pj +
P
j2N (uj   pj) < k + 1  n
holds as well, which is a contradiction.
(P1.2) The proof is analogous to the one used to prove part (P1.1), and hence we
omit it. 
Proposition 1 implies that the real numbers ; b;  and b used to dene the four rules
do exist and they are unique, and hence the rules are well-dened. To see that, observe
that fEL and fCEL start allotting the good from p in a continuous and egalitarian
(or constrained egalitarian) way until the full amount [
P
j2N pj] is allotted. On the
other hand, fEA and fCEA start allotting the good from the vector of relevant extremes
of the individually rational intervals in a continuous and egalitarian (or constrained
egalitarian) way until the full amount [
P
j2N pj] is allotted. Proposition 1 guarantees
that the direction of the allotment process goes in the right direction to reach [
P
j2N pj],
from either one of the two starting vectors. So, Corollary 1 holds.
Corollary 1 The real numbers ; b;  and b, used to dene respectively fEL; fCEL;
fEA and fCEA do exist and they are unique.
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5 Results for symmetric single-peaked preferences
5.1 Individual rationality, e¢ ciency and basic impossibilities
In the next proposition we present some results related with the properties of rules,
whenever they operate on problems where agents preferences are symmetric single-
peaked. The rst result characterizes individually rational rules by stating that a rule is
individually rational if and only if, for all proles, the rule selects a vector of allotments
that lie on the individually rational intervals of their associated peaks. The second
result characterizes e¢ cient rules by means of two conditions. First, at each prole
the rule allots the integer amount that is closest to the sum of all peaks and second,
all agents receive more (or less) than their peaks whenever the sum of all peaks is
smaller (or larger) than the closest integer to the sum of peaks. We also show that some
basic incompatibilities among properties of rules hold, even when agentspreferences are
restricted to be symmetric single-peaked.
Proposition 2 The following statements hold.
(P2.1) A rule f on PS is individually rational if and only if, for all 2 PS and i 2 N;
fi () 2 [li; ui] :
(P2.2) A rule f on PS is e¢ cient if and only if, for all 2 PS; two conditions hold:
(E2.1)
P
j2N fj () = [
P
j2N pj]:
(E2.2) For all i 2 N; fi ()  pi when
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] and fi ()  pi whenP
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj]:
(P2.3) There is no rule on PS satisfying e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness.
(P2.4) There is no rule on PS satisfying group rationality and e¢ ciency.
(P2.5) There is no rule on PS satisfying individual rationality and envy-freeness on
losses.
(P2.6) There is no rule on PS satisfying individual rationality, e¢ ciency, and envy-
freeness.11
Proof
(P2.1) It is obvious.
11There are however rules on PS satisfying simultaneously individual rationality and envy-freeness.
For instance, the rule f that, at each prole, assigns to each agent the closest integer to her peak. To
see that f is not e¢ cient, consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where N = f1; 2g and p = (0:6; 0:8): Then,
f() = (1; 1); which is Pareto dominated by the feasible allotment (0:35; 0:65): To characterize the class
of all individually rational and envy-free rules is an interesting problem, but since we want to focus here
on individually rational and either e¢ cient or strategy-proof rules, we leave it open for further research.
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(P2.2) Let f be an e¢ cient rule on PS. We show that f satises (E2.1). Suppose not;
i.e., there exists 2 PS such thatPj2N fj () 6= [Pj2N pj]: We proceed with the proof
assuming that
P
j2N fj () < [
P
j2N pj] (the proof of the other case is analogous, and
hence we omit it). Then, and since
P
j2N fj () 2 N0, there exists at least one j0 2 N
such that
fj0() < pj0 : (3)
Moreover, we can assume that fi()  pi for all i 2 N: To see that, suppose fi0() > pi0
for some i0. Then, there would exist " > 0 such that pi0 < yi0 = fi0()  " < fi0() and
fj0() < yj0 = fj0()+" < pj0 : Set yi = fi(), for all i 6= i0; j0 (if any). Hence,
P
j2N yj =P
j2N fj () 2 N0: Thus, y 2 FA and yi0 i0 fi0(); yj0 j0 fj0() and yi i fi() for
all i 6= i0; j0; which would imply that f is not e¢ cient. By (3), Pj2N fj () <Pj2N pj:
If
P
j2N fj () < [
P
j2N pj] 
P
j2N pj; then there would exist y 2 FA such thatP
j2N yj = [
P
j2N pj], yi 2 [fi(); pi] for all i; and yj0 2 (fj0(); pj0 ] for at least one
j0; contradicting e¢ ciency of f: Thus, we can assume that
P
j2N fj () <
P
j2N pj <
[
P
j2N pj]: Dene z =
P
j2N pj  
P
j2N fj () > 0: By denition of [
P
j2N pj], and sinceP
j2N fj () 2 N0;
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj] <
P
j2N pj + z: Dene y = (y1; : : : ; yn) 2 RN+
such that
P
j2N yj 2 N0 and, for all i 2 N; yi 2 [pi; 2pi fi()] and yj0 2 (pj0 ; 2pj0 fj0())
for at least one j0 2 N: To see that there exists such y with the property thatPj2N yj =
[
P
j2N pj] 2 N0, observe thatP
j2N pj <
P
j2N yj <
P
j2N 2pj  
P
j2N fj() =
P
j2N pj + z:
Since preferences are symmetric single-peaked, for all i 2 N; yi i fi() and there exists
j0 such that yj0 j0 fj0(): Hence, f is not e¢ cient. This proves that (E2.1) holds.
We now prove that f satises (E2.2). We only consider the case
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj]
(the proof of the other case is analogous, and hence we omit it). Suppose not. Then,
there exists i 2 N such that fi () > pi: Since, by hypothesis and (E2.1),
P
j2N pj 
[
P
j2N pj] =
P
j2N fj(), there exists j0 2 N such that fj0 () < pj0 : Let " be such
that 0 < " < minffi ()   pi; pj0   fj0 ()g: Then, the feasible vector of allotments
(fi () "; fj0 ()+"; (fj ())j2Nnfi;j0g) Pareto dominates f () : Hence, f is not e¢ cient.
This proves that (E2.2) holds.
We now prove the reciprocal. Let f be a rule satisfying (E2.1) and (E2.2). We only
consider the case
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] (the proof of the other case is analogous, and
hence we omit it). By (E2.2), fi()  pi for all i 2 N: Suppose f is not e¢ cient. Then,
there exists y = (y1; : : : ; yn) 2 FA that Pareto dominates f () : Since preferences
are symmetric single-peaked, for all i 2 N; yi 2 [fi () ; pi + (pi   fi ())] and yj0 2
(fj0 () ; pj0 + (pj0   fj0 ())) for some j0 2 N: By (E2.1), the denition of the integer
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[
P
j2N pj] and our assumption,P
j2N fj () = [
P
j2N pj] 
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] + 0:5
holds. Thus, P
j2N fj () <
P
j2N yj
<
P
j2N (pj + (pj   fj ()))
=
P
j2N pj +
P
j2N (pj   fj ())
 Pj2N pj + 0:5
 [Pj2N pj] + 1;
where the rst weak inequality follows from the fact that
P
j2N(pj   fj())  0:5: In
particular,
P
j2N yj < [
P
j2N pj] + 1: Since, by (E2.1),
P
j2N fj () = [
P
j2N pj] andP
j2N yj 2 N0; we deduce that
P
j2N yj = [
P
j2N pj] + 1, a contradiction.
(P2.3) Assume f is e¢ cient and strategy-proof on PS. We evaluate f at ve problems
(N;(t)) 2 PS where N = f1; 2g and t = 1; 2; 3; 4; and 5.
Consider the prole (1) where p(1) = (0:26; 0:26) : By (P2.2) in Proposition 2,
f1
 (1) + f2  (1) = 1 and fi  (1)  0:26 for all i 2 N: Let (2) be such that
p(2) = (0:26; 0) : By (P2.2) in Proposition 2, f1
 (2) + f2  (2) = 0: Thus, f  (2) =
(0; 0) : Let (3) be such that p(3) = (0; 0:26) : Similarly, f  (3) = (0; 0). By strategy-
proofness, f1
 (1) (1)1 f1  (3) = 0: Since preferences are symmetric, f1  (1)  0:52:
Similarly, f2
 (1)  0:52: Thus, 0:48  fi  (1)  0:52 for all i 2 N:
Consider the prole (4) where p(4) = (0:26; 0:3) : Similarly to (1); we can prove that
0:4  f1
 (4)  0:52 and 0:48  f2  (4)  0:6: We now obtain a contradiction in
each of the three possible cases below.
1. f2
 (1) > f2  (4) : Since f2  (4)  0:48 > 0:26 = p(1)2 and preferences are sym-
metric single-peaked, f2
 (4) (1)2 f2  (1) ; which contradicts strategy-proofness
because agent 2 manipulates f at prole (1) via (4)2 with p(4)2 = 0:3:
2. f2
 (1) < f2  (4) : Since f2  (1)  0:48 > 0:3 = p(4)2 and preferences are sym-
metric single-peaked, f2
 (1) (4)2 f2  (4) ; which contradicts strategy-proofness
because agent 2 manipulates f at prole (4) via (1)2 with p(1)2 = 0:26:
3. f2
 (1) = f2  (4) : Thus, f1  (1) = f1  (4) and 0:48  fi  (4)  0:52
for all i 2 N: Consider the prole (5) where p(5) = (0:21; 0:3) : Similarly to the
prole (1) we can show that 0:4  f1
 (5)  0:42 and 0:58  f2  (5) 
0:6: Since f1
 (4)  0:48 > 0:42  f1  (5) > 0:26 = p(4)1 and preferences
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are symmetric single-peaked, f1
 (5) (4)1 f1  (4) ; which contradicts strategy-
proofness because agent 1 manipulates f at prole (4) via (5)1 with p(5)1 = 0:21:
(P2.4) Assume f satises group rationality and e¢ ciency on PS. Consider the prob-
lem (N;) 2 PS whereN = f1; 2; 3g and p = (0:8; 0:4; 0:4) : By e¢ ciency,Pi2N fi () =
2 and fi ()  pi for all i 2 N: To apply the property of group rationality, consider the
following table indicating, for each subset of agents with cardinality two, the aggregate
loss, assuming the best integer amount is allotted (i.e., for each S  N with jSj = 2;
min
k2N0
Pj2S pj   k).
S min
k2N0
Pj2S pj   k
f1; 2g 0.2
f1; 3g 0.2
f2; 3g 0.2
Observe that 0:4 =
Pj2N pj  Pj2N fj () = Pj2N (fj ()  pj) : Suppose rst that
fi () pi = 0:43 for all i 2 N: Then, for any S ( N with two agents,
Pj2S pj  Pj2S fj () =
0:8
3
> 0:2 = min
x2N0
Pj2S pj   x : Hence, f does not satisfy group rationality. Suppose
now that there exists i 2 N such that (fi ()  pi) < 0:43 : Then, by setting S = Nnfig;Pj2S pj  Pj2S fj () > 0:83 > 0:2 = mink2N0
Pj2S pj   k ; again a contradiction with
group rationality of f:
(P2.5) Assume f satises individual rationality and envy-freeness on losses on PS.
Consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where N = f1; 2g and p = (1; 0:7) : By individual
rationality, f1 () = 1: Thus, f2 () 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g which means that agent 2 envies the
zero loss (f1 ()  p1 = 0) of agent 1.
(P2.6) Assume f satises individual rationality, e¢ ciency, and envy-freeness on PS.
Consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where N = f1; 2g and p = (0:2; 0:35) : By individual
rationality, 0  f1 ()  0:4 and 0  f2 ()  0:7: By e¢ ciency and (P2.2) in Propo-
sition 2, f1 () + f2 () = 1: Thus, 0:3  f1 ()  0:4 and 0:6  f2 ()  0:7: Then,
f1 () 2 f2 () ; which contradicts envy-freeness. 
Our main objective in this paper is to identify individually rational rules to be used
to solve the division problem when the integer number of units is endogenous and agents
preferences are symmetric single-peaked. Part (P2.1) in Proposition 2 characterizes the
class of all individually rational rules. Since this class is large, it is natural to ask whether
individual rationality is compatible with other additional properties. E¢ ciency and
strategy-proofness emerge as two of the most basic and desirable properties. However,
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(P2.3) in Proposition 2 says that no rule satises the two properties simultaneously.
In the next two subsections we study rules that are individually rational and e¢ cient
(Subsection 5.2) and rules that are individually rational and strategy-proof (Subsection
5.3). For the rst case, we identify the constrained equal losses rule and the constrained
equal awards rule as the unique ones that in addition of being individually rational and
e¢ cient satisfy also either justied envy-freeness on losses or envy-freeness on awards,
respectively (Theorem 1). In contrast, in Subsection 5.3 we rst show that although
there are individually rational and strategy-proof rules, they are not very interesting
(since they are not unanimous, for instance). Then, we show in Proposition 4 that
individually rationality and strategy-proofness are indeed incompatible with unanimity.
5.2 Individual rationality and e¢ ciency
Let 2 PS be a problem. Denote by IRE () the set of feasible vectors of allotments
satisfying individual rationality and e¢ ciency. It is easy to see that, by using similar
arguments to the ones used to check that (P2.1) and (P2.2) in Proposition 2 hold, this
set can be written as
IRE () = fx 2 RN+ j
P
j2N xj = [
P
j2N pj] and, for all i 2 N ,
li  xi  pi when
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] and
pi  xi  ui when
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj]g:
By Proposition 1, the set IRE() is non-empty. Hence, a rule f satises individual
rationality and e¢ ciency if and only if, for each 2 PS; f () 2 IRE () :
However, individual rationality and e¢ ciency are properties of rules that apply only
to each problem separately. They do not impose conditions on how the rule should
behave across problems. Thus, and given two di¤erent criteria compatible with indi-
vidual rationality and e¢ ciency, a rule can choose, in an arbitrary way, at problem 
an allocation in IRE(), following one criterion, while choosing at problem 0 an al-
location in IRE(0), following the other criterion. For instance the rule f that selects
fCEL () when [Pj2N pj] is odd and fCEA () when [Pj2N pj] is even satises indi-
vidual rationality and e¢ ciency.12 Thus, it seems appropriate to require that the rule
satises an additional property in order to eliminate this kind of arbitrariness. We will
focus on two alternative properties related to envy-freeness: justied envy-freeness on
losses and envy-freeness on awards. But then, the consequence of requiring that rules
(in addition of being individually rational and e¢ cient) satisfy either one of these two
forms of non-envyness is that only one rule is left, either the constrained equal losses
12Proposition 3 below will guarantee that fCEL () ; fCEA () 2 IRE () for all 2 PS .
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or the constrained equal awards, respectively. Theorem 1, the main result of the paper,
characterizes axiomatically the constrained equal losses rule fCEL and the constrained
equal awards rule fCEA on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Theorem 1 The following two characterizations hold.
(T1.1) The constrained equal losses rule fCEL is the unique rule on PS satisfying indi-
vidual rationality, e¢ ciency, and justied envy-freeness on losses.
(T1.2) The constrained equal awards rule fCEA is the unique rule on PS satisfying
individual rationality, e¢ ciency, and envy-freeness on awards.
Before proving Theorem 1, we provide in Proposition 3 preliminary results on the
two rules that will be useful along the proof of Theorem 1 and in the sequel.
Proposition 3
(P3.1) The constrained equal losses rule on PS satises individual rationality, e¢ ciency,
justied envy-freeness on losses, participation, unanimity and equal treatment of equals.
(P3.2) The constrained equal losses rule on PS does not satisfy strategy-proofness, group
rationality, envy-freeness, envy-freeness on losses, and envy-freeness on awards.
(P3.3) The constrained equal awards rule on PS satises individual rationality, e¢ ciency,
envy-freeness on awards, participation, unanimity and equal treatment of equals.
(P3.4) The constrained equal awards rule on PS does not satisfy strategy-proofness, group
rationality, envy-freeness, envy-freeness on losses, and justied envy-freeness on losses.
Proof of Proposition 3
(P3.1) That fCEL satises unanimity and equal treatment of equals follows directly
from its denition. Now, we show that fCEL satises the other properties.
Individual rationality. By its denition, for all 2 PS and i 2 N , fCELi () 2 [li; ui] :
By (P2.1) in Proposition 2, fCEL is individually rational.
E¢ ciency. By its denition, fCEL satises conditions (E2.1) and (E2.2) in Proposi-
tion 2. Hence, by (P2.2), fCEL is e¢ cient.
Justied envy-freeness on losses. Suppose that
P
ji2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] (the proof of
the other case is analogous, and hence we omit it). Let j 2 N be such that
fCELj () j k for all k 2 N0: (4)
We want to show that for all i 2 N; fCELi () i maxfpi + (fCELj ()   pj); 0g: By
denition, fCELj () = pj   minfb; pj   ljg: If pj   lj  b, then fCELj () = lj; which
contradicts (4) because fCELj () j lj  uj and either lj or uj is an integer. Hence,
fCELj () = pj   b: (5)
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Let i 2 N be arbitrary. We distinguish between two cases. First, b  pi   li. Then, by
(5), fCELi () = pi   b = pi + (fCELj ()  pj); which means that fCELi () = maxfpi +
(fCELj () pj); 0g: Hence, fCELi () i maxfpi+(fCELj () pj); 0g: Second, b > pi li.
Then, by denition, fCELi () = li: Since, by (5), pi+(fCELj () pj) = pi  b < li  pi,
single-peakedness implies that fCELi () i maxfpi + (fCELj ()  pj); 0g:
Participation. Let 2 PS be such that k  pi for some i 2 N and k 2 N0. We
want to show that fCELi () = k + fCELi

pi ki ; i

: Set 0= (pi ki ; i) and p0 =
(pi   k; (pj)j2Nnfig): Suppose that
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] (the proof of the other case
is analogous, and hence we omit it). Then, fCELi () = pi   min fb; pi   lig where b
satises
P
j2N f
CEL
j () = [
P
j2N pj]: Since p
0
i = pi   k and k is an integer, [
P
j2N p
0
j] =
[
P
j2N pj] k. Hence,
P
j2N p
0
j  [
P
j2N p
0
j]: Now, f
CEL
i (0) = p0i minfb0; p0i l0ig whereb0 satisesPj2N fCELj (0) = [Pj2N p0j]: Since l0i = li   k and l0j = lj for all j 2 Nn fig ;
we deduce that b0 = b: Then,
fCELi (0) = pi   k  min fb; pi   k   (li   k)g
= pi  min fb; pi   lig   k
= fCELi ()  k;
which is what we wanted to show.
(P3.2) We show that fCEL does not satisfy the following properties on PS.
Strategy-proofness. Consider the problems (N;) and (N;0) where N = f1; 2g,
p = (0:4; 0:8) and p0 = (0:4; 0:9) : Then, fCEL () = (0:3; 0:7) and fCEL (0) = (0:2; 0:8) :
Since 0:8 2 0:7, fCEL does not satisfy strategy-proofness because agent 2 manipulates
fCEL at prole  via 02 :
Group rationality. It follows from (P3.1) and (P2.4).
Envy-freeness. Consider the problem (N;) where N = f1; 2g and p = (0:40; 0:46) :
Then, fCEL () = (0:47; 0:53) ; which contradicts envy-freeness because agent 2 strictly
prefers 0:47 to 0:53:
Envy-freeness on losses. If follows from (P3.1) and (P2.5).
Envy-freeness on awards. Consider the problem (N;) where N = f1; 2g and p =
(0:4; 0:46) : Then, fCEL () = (0:47; 0:53) : Therefore, a1(; fCEL) = 0:8   0:47 = 0:33
and a2(; fCEL) = 0:92   0:53 = 0:39: For 0:38 2 [0:33; 0:39]; we have that fCEL1 () =
0:47 1 0:38. Thus, fCEL does not satisfy envy-freeness on awards.
(P3.3) That fCEA satises unanimity and equal treatment of equals follows directly
from its denition. Now, we show that fCEA satises the other properties.
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Individual rationality. By its denition, for all 2 PS and i 2 N , fCEAi () 2 [li; ui] :
By (P2.1) in Proposition 2, fCEL is individually rational.
E¢ ciency. By its denition, fCEA satises conditions (E2.1) and (E2.2) in Proposi-
tion 2. Hence, by (P2.2), fCEA is e¢ cient.
Envy-freeness on awards. Suppose that
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] (the proof of the other
case is analogous, and hence we omit it). Since fCEA is e¢ cient, by (E2.2) in (P2.2) of
Proposition 2, fCEAi ()  pi for all i 2 N: Suppose that fCEA does not satisfy envy-
freeness on awards. Then, there exist i; j 2 N and x 2 [min fai; ajg ;max fai; ajg] such
that
li + x i fCEAi () : (6)
Hence, fCEAi () is not the peak ofi and so fCEAi () < pi:Moreover, since by denition
fCEAi () = li +minfb; pi   lig; b < pi   li and
fCEAi () = li + b (7)
hold. Thus, ai = b: We distinguish between two cases. First, minfb; pj   ljg = b: Since
aj = f
CEA
j ()  lj = b; it must be the case that x = b. Hence, by (6),
li + b = li + x i fCEAi () = li + b;
which is a contradiction. Second, minfb; pj   ljg = pj   lj < b: By the denition of
fCEA; fCEAj () = pj and aj = fCEAj ()  lj = pj   lj: Thus, x 2 [pj   lj; b] and
li + x  li + b = fCEAi ()  pi;
where the equality follows from (7). By single-peakedness, fCEAi () i li + x; a contra-
diction with (6).
Participation. Let 2 PS be such that k  pi for some i 2 N and k 2 N0. We
want to show that fCEAi () = k + fCEAi

pi ki ; i

: Set 0= (pi ki ; i) and p0 =
(pi   k; (pj)j2Nnfig): Suppose that
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj] (the proof of the other case
is analogous, and hence we omit it). Then, fCEAi () = li + minfb; pi   lig where b
satises
P
j2N f
CEA
j () = [
P
j2N pj]: Since p
0
i = pi   k and k is an integer, [
P
j2N p
0
j] =
[
P
j2N pj] k. Hence,
P
j2N p
0
j  [
P
j2N p
0
j]: Now, f
CEA
i (0) = l0i+minfb0; p0i  l0ig whereb0 satisesPj2N fCEAj (0) = [Pj2N p0j]: Since l0i = li   k and l0j = lj for all j 2 Nn fig ;
we deduce that b0 = b: Then,
fCEAi (0) = li   k +minfb; pi   k   (li   k)g
= li +minfb; pi   lig   k
= fCEAi ()  k;
23
which is what we wanted to prove.
(P3.4) We show that fCEA does not satisfy the following properties on PS.
Strategy-proofness. Consider the problems (N;) and (N;0) where N = f1; 2g,
p = (0:4; 0:8) and p0 = (0:6; 0:8): Then, fCEA () = (0:2; 0:8) and fCEA (0) = (0:3; 0:7) :
Since 0:3 1 0:2; fCEA does not satisfy strategy-proofness because agent 1 manipulates
fCEA at prole  via 01 :
Group rationality. It follows from (P3.3) and (P2.4).
Envy-freeness. Consider the problem (N;) where N = f1; 2g and p = (0:6; 0:8):
Then, fCEA () = (0:3; 0:7) ; which means that fCEA is not envy-free because agent 1
strictly prefers 0:7 to 0:3:
Envy-freeness on losses. It follows from (P3.3) and (P2.5).
Justied envy-freeness on losses. Consider the problem (N;) where N = f1; 2g and
p = (0:6; 0:8): Then, fCEA () = (0:3; 0:7) ; which means that fCEA does not satisfy
justied envy-freeness on losses because agent 1 strictly prefers 0:6 + (0:7  0:8) = 0:5
to 0:3: 
Proof of Theorem 1 By Proposition 3, fCEL satises individual rationality, e¢ ciency
and justied envy-freeness on losses and fCEA satises individual rationality, e¢ ciency
and envy-freeness on awards.
Before we prove uniqueness for each rule separately, let 2 PS be a problem and
let f be a rule satisfying individual rationality and e¢ ciency. Suppose that
P
j2N pj 
[
P
j2N pj] (the proof for the other case is analogous, and hence we omit it). Since f is
e¢ cient, by (E2.1) and (E2.2) in (P2.2) of Proposition 2,
P
j2N fj () = [
P
j2N pj] and
fi ()  pi (8)
for all i 2 N: By individual rationality and (P2.1) in Proposition 2, fi ()  li for all
i 2 N:
We rst show uniqueness of fCEL: For each i 2 N; fi () = pi   xi where 0  xi 
pi li. Assume rst that xi = x for all i 2 N: Then, setting b = x, we have fi() = pi b
and b  pi  li for all i 2 N: Thus, f() = fCEL(): Assume now that xj < xi for some
pair i; j 2 N: By single peakedness, pi   xj i pi   xi: Since
fi () = pi   xi i pi   xj = pi + (fj ()  pj)
holds, by justied envy-freeness on losses, there must exist yj 2 N0 such that fj () j yj:
By individual rationality,
fj () = lj: (9)
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Let S be the set of agents with the largest loss from the peak: Namely, S = fi0 2
N j xi0  xj0 for all j0 2 Ng: Since N is nite, S 6= ;: Moreover, our assumption
that xj < xi for some pair i; j 2 N implies S ( N: For any bj 2 S; set b = x|^ and
observe that fbj() = pbj   b  pbj   lbj: Hence, fbj() = pbj   minfb; pbj   lbjg: Take any
j0 =2 S; then there exists i0 2 S such that xj0 < xi0 : By (9), fj0 () = lj0 : Since b > xj0 ;
fj0() = lj0 = pj0  minfb; pj0   lj0g: Thus, f() = fCEL():
We now show uniqueness of fCEA: By (8), for each i 2 N , fi () = li + ai and
0  ai  pi   li. We rst prove that if ai < aj for some pair i; j 2 N; then ai = pi   li:
Assume not; there exist i; j 2 N such that ai < aj and ai < pi   li: Let x 2 R+
be such that x 2 (ai;min faj; pi   lig] : Since fi () = li + ai < li + x  pi, single-
peakedness implies that li + x i fi () where x 2 (ai; aj], contradicting envy-freeness
on awards. Let S be the set of agents with the largest award from the peak: Namely,
S = fi0 2 N j ai0  aj0 for all j0 2 Ng: Since N is nite, S 6= ;: If S = N; then
there exists a such that a 2 [0; pi   li] and fi() = li + a for all i 2 N: Set b = a:
Hence, fi() = li + minfb; pi   lig; implying that f() = fCEA(): Assume S ( N:
For all j; j0 2 S; aj = aj0 : Set b = aj and observe that fj() = lj + b  pj and so
fj() = lj + minfb; pj   ljg: If i =2 S; then there exists j 2 S such that aj > ai: Then,
ai = pi   li: Hence, fi () = li + ai = li + minfb; pi   lig since pi   li = ai < aj = b:
Thus, f() = fCEA(): 
Remark 2 The two sets of properties used in the two characterizations of Theorem 1
are independent.
(R2.1) The rule f dened by setting fi () = [pi] for all 2 PS and all i 2 N satises
individual rationality and justied envy-freeness on losses but it is not e¢ cient.
(R2.2) The rule fEL satises e¢ ciency and justied envy-freeness on losses but is not
individually rational.
(R2.3) The rule fCEA satises individual rationality and e¢ ciency but it does not satisfy
justied envy-freeness on losses.
(R2.4) The rule f dened by setting fi () = [pi] for all 2 PS and all i 2 N satises
individual rationality and envy-freeness on awards but it is not e¢ cient.
(R2.5) The rule fEA satises e¢ ciency and envy-freeness on awards but it is not indi-
vidually rational.
(R2.6) The rule fCEL satises individual rationality and e¢ ciency but it is not envy-
freeness on awards.
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5.3 Individual rationality and strategy-proofness
We now study the set of rules satisfying individual rationality and strategy-proofness
on the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences. There are many rules satisfying
both properties. For instance, the rule that selects f () = ([pi])i2N for all 2 PS is
individually rational and strategy-proof. But there are many more, yet some of them are
very di¢ cult to justify as reasonable solutions to the problem. Consider the following
family of rules. For each vector x 2 RN+ satisfying
P
i2N xi 2 N0; dene fx as the rule
that when x is at least as good as ([pi])i2N for each i 2 N; fx selects x: Otherwise
fx selects ([pi])i2N : Formally, x x 2 RN+ satisfying
P
i2N xi 2 N0. For each problem
2 PS; set
fx () =
(
x if xi i [pi] for all i 2 N
([pi])i2N otherwise.
It is easy to see that each rule in the family ffx j x 2 RN+ and
P
i2N xi 2 N0g is indi-
vidually rational and strategy-proof. However, they are arbitrary and non-interesting.13
Thus, we ask whether it is possible to identify a subset of individually rational and
strategy-proof rules satisfying additionally a basic, weak and desirable property. We
interpret Proposition 4 below as giving a negative answer to this question: individual
rationality and strategy-proofness are not compatible even with unanimity, a very weak
form of e¢ ciency.
Proposition 4 There is no rule on PS satisfying individual rationality, strategy-
proofness and unanimity.
Proof To obtain a contradiction, assume that f is a rule satisfying individual ratio-
nality, strategy-proofness and unanimity. Consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where
N = f1; 2g and p = (0:2; 0:8): Since preferences are symmetric single-peaked we identify,
in the remainder of this proof, each preference i with its peak pi; and so we write f(p)
instead of f(): By unanimity, f (0:2; 0:8) = (0:2; 0:8) : Consider f (0:2; 0:5) and suppose
that f2 (0:2; 0:5) > 0:8; then, agent 2 manipulates f at prole (0:2; 0:5) via 0:8. This
contradicts strategy-proofness of f: Hence, f2 (0:2; 0:5)  0:8.
Claim: f2 (0:2; 0:5) = 0:8.
Proof: Suppose f2 (0:2; 0:5) < 0:8. Thus, f (0:2; 0:5) = (0:2 + x; 0:8  x) where 0 < x 
0:8. By individual rationality of agent 1; 0  0:2 + x  0:4, which means that x  0:2:
13Indeed, some rules in this family are bossy (see Thomson (2016) for a survey on non-bossiness) while
the previous rule selecting ([pi])i2N is non-bossy. It would be interesting to identify inside the class
of individually rational and strategy-proof rules those that are also non-bossy (and satisfy additionally
some other desirable property as equal treatment of equals), but we leave this analysis for further
research.
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Thus, 0 < x  0:2. Let y > 0 be such that
0:2  x < y < 0:2: (10)
Thus, f1 (y; 0:5)  0:2 + x (otherwise agent 1 manipulates f at prole (y; 0:5) via 0:2):
To show that indeed f1 (y; 0:5) = 0:2 + x we distinguish between two di¤erent cases:
1. 0:2 x < f1 (y; 0:5) < 0:2+x: Then, agent 1 manipulates f at prole (0:2; 0:5) via
y: This contradicts strategy-proofness of f:
2. f1 (y; 0:5)  0:2   x. Since f satises individual rationality two subcases are
possible.
(a) f1 (y; 0:5)+f2 (y; 0:5) = 1: Then, f2 (y; 0:5)  0:8+x: By unanimity, f2 (y; 1  y) =
1   y. From (10), y < 0:2 which is equivalent to  1 + y <  1 + 0:2 and to
1   y > 0:8: Hence, 1   y > 0:5: From (10) again, 0:2   x < y; which is
equivalent to  1 + 0:2   x <  1 + y and to 0:8 + x > 1   y: Therefore,
0:5 < 1   y < 0:8 + x; and so agent 2 manipulates f at prole (y; 0:5) via
1  y. This contradicts strategy-proofness of f:
(b) f1 (y; 0:5)+f2 (y; 0:5) = 0: Then, f2 (y; 0:5) = 0: Again, agent 2 manipulates f
at prole (y; 0:5) via 1  y since 0:5 < 1  y < 1;where the rst inequality fol-
lows from (10) and the second from y > 0: This contradicts strategy-proofness
of f:
Hence, f1 (y; 0:5) = 0:2 + x. We show now that f1(0:2   x; 0:5) = 0:2 + x: If f1(0:2  
x; 0:5) > 0:2 + x then 1 manipulates f at prole (0:2   x; 0:5) via y: Suppose f1(0:2  
x; 0:5) =: z < 0:2+x: If z = y; then agent 1 manipulates f at prole (y; 0:5) via 0:2 x. If
z > y; then agent 1 manipulates f at (y; 0:5) via 0:2 x; because jy   zj < jy   (0:2 + x)j
since z   y < 0:2 + x   y if and only if z < 0:2 + x: Let z < y and assume rst that
x = 0:2: Then, and since y < 0:2, 2y   (0:2 + x) = 2y   0:4 < 0: Then, 0  z < y and
jy   zj < jy   (0:2 + x)j ; and hence agent 1 manipulates f at (y; 0:5) via 0:2   x since
f1(0:2 x; 0:5) = z y1 0:2+x = f1(y; 0:5): Assume now that x < 0:2:We can distinguish
two cases:
1. 2y   (0:2 + x) < z < y: Then, f1(0:2   x; 0:5) y1 f1(y; 0:5); which contradicts
strategy-proofness.
2. z  2y (0:2+x): Since f satises individual rationality, two subcases are possible.
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(a) f1(0:2 x; 0:5)+ f2(0:2 x; 0:5) = 1: Then, f2(0:2 x; 0:5)  1  (2y  (0:2+
x)) > 0:8+x: Hence, f2(0:2 x; 0:8+x) = 0:8+x 0:52 f2(0:2 x; 0:5); which
contradicts strategy-proofness.
(b) f1(0:2   x; 0:5) + f2(0:2   x; 0:5) = 0: Then, f2(0:2   x; 0:5) = 0: Hence,
f2(0:2  x; 0:8+ x) = 0:8+ x 0:52 f2(0:2  x; 0:5); which contradicts strategy-
proofness.
Hence, f1(0:2 x; 0:5) = 0:2+x: Now, by individual rationality of agent 1; j0:2  x  0j 
j0:2  x  0:2  xj ; so 0:2  x  2x; or equivalently, x  0:2
3
:
Consider now the prole (0:2  x; 0:5) instead of (0:2; 0:5) :We now that f1 (0:2  x; 0:5) =
0:2 + x = 0:2   x + 2x: We have proved for (0:2; 0:5) that if f1 (0; 2; 0:5) = 0:2 + x;
then f1 (0; 2  x; 0:5) = 0:2 + x: We now apply to (0:2  x; 0:5) the same argument
used for the prole (0:2; 0:5) : Since f1 (0:2  x; 0:5) = 0:2 + x = 0:2   x + 2x14 we
can conclude that f1 (0:2  3x; 0:5) = 0:2 + x: By individual rationality of agent 1;
j0:2  3x  0j  j0:2  3x  0:2  xj ; so 0:2  3x  4x; or equivalently, x  0:2
7
:
Since x > 0 is xed, repeating this process several times we will eventually nd a
contradiction with individual rationality of agent 1. Then, f (0:2; 0:5) = (0:2; 0:8) ; which
proves the claim. 
Consider now the prole (0:2; 0:39) : We distinguish among three di¤erent cases:
1. f1 (0:2; 0:39) + f2 (0:2; 0:39)  2: By individual rationality, f1 (0:2; 0:39)  0:4 and
f2 (0:2; 0:39)  0:78; which is a contradiction.
2. f1 (0:2; 0:39)+f2 (0:2; 0:39) = 1: By individual rationality of agent 1, f1 (0:2; 0:39) 
0:4, and so 0:6  f2 (0:2; 0:39) : By individual rationality of agent 2; f2 (0:2; 0:39) 
0:78: Thus, agent 2 manipulates f at prole (0:2; 0:5) via 0:39. This contradicts
strategy-proofness.
3. f1 (0:2; 0:39)+ f2 (0:2; 0:39) = 0: Then, f1 (0:2; 0:39) = f2 (0:2; 0:39) = 0: By Claim
1 we know that f (0:2; 0:5) = (0:2; 0:8) : Using arguments similar to those used in
the proof of Claim 1 we can prove that f (0:38; 0:39) = (0:38; 0:62). Thus, agent 1
manipulates f at prole (0:2; 0:39) via 0:38. This contradicts strategy-proofness.
Since we have obtained a contradiction in each of the possible cases, there does not
exist a rule satisfying simultaneously the properties of individual rationality, strategy-
proofness and unanimity. 
By (R1.1) in Remark 1 and Proposition 4 we obtain the following Corollary.
142x plays now the same role than x for 0:2; 0:5):
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Corollary 2 There is no rule on PS satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness
and e¢ ciency.
6 Final remarks
Before nishing the paper we deal with two natural questions. First, are our results
generalizable to rules dened on P, the set of problems where agents have single-peaked
preferences? Second, how do well-known rules, used to solve the division problem with
a xed amount of the good, behave when the number of units to allot is endogenous?
We partially answer the two questions separately in each of the next two subsections.
6.1 Results for general single-peaked preferences
Obviously, all the impossibility results we have obtained for rules operating on the domain
of symmetric single-peaked preferences also hold when they operate on the larger domain.
Proposition 5 contains some results on rules operating on the full domain of single-
peaked preferences. But before stating it, we need some additional notation to refer to
the extremes of the individually rational intervals for those preferences. Let i be a
single-peaked preference with peak pi: Dene
bi =
(
bpic if bpic i dpie
dpie otherwise.
(11)
By continuity and single-peakedness, there are two numbers bli; bui 2 R+ satisfying the
following conditions: (i) bi 2 fbli; buig; (ii) bli  bui; (iii) for each yi 2 [bli; bui]; yi i bi; and
(iv) for all yi =2 [bli; bui]; bi i yi:
Proposition 5 The following statements hold.
(P5.1) A rule f on P is individually rational if and only if, for all 2 P and i 2 N ,
fi () 2 [bli; bui]:
(P5.2) A rule f on P is e¢ cient if and only if, for all 2 P, two conditions hold:
(E5.1)
P
j2N fj () 2 f
jP
j2N pj
k
;
lP
j2N pj
m
g:
(E5.2) For all i 2 N; fi ()  pi when
P
j2N pj 
P
j2N fj () and fi ()  pi whenP
j2N pj <
P
j2N fj () :
(P5.3) There exist rules on P satisfying individual rationality and e¢ ciency.
(P5.4) There exist rules on P satisfying individual rationality and strategy-proofness.
Proof (P5.1) It is obvious.
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(P5.2) It is similar to the proof of (P2.2) in Proposition 2, and hence we omit it.
(P5.3) It is enough to prove that for each 2 P the set of individually rational and
e¢ cient vector of allotments is non-empty because any rule selecting some allotment in
this set satises both properties.
Fix a prole 2 P and let p = (p1; : : : ; pn) be its associated vector of peaks. Similarly
to (E5.1), any e¢ cient vector of allotments y satises
P
j2N yj 2 f
jP
j2N pj
k
;
lP
j2N pj
m
g:
For each i 2 N , consider bi dened as in (11). Suppose that
P
j2N bj 
jP
j2N pj
k
(the
other case is analogous, and hence we omit it). Consider the allotment x = (x1; : : : ; xn)
such that, for each i 2 N;
xi =
(
pi if bi = bpicbli +minfpi   bli; g otherwise,
where  satises
P
j2N xj =
jP
j2N pj
k
. By continuity of the vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn)
with respect to the parameter , and the fact that
P
j2N bj 
jP
j2N pj
k
holds, such 
exists. By denition, xi 2 [bli; pi] for all i 2 N and so, xi is individually rational. Suppose
that x is not an e¢ cient allotment. By the denition of x; the Pareto improvement
requires a di¤erent integer choice. Hence, there exists y 2 RN+ such that
P
j2N yj =lP
j2N pj
m
and yi i xi for all i 2 N and yj j xj for some j 2 N: Thus, by (P5.1) and
(P5.2), y is a feasible vector of allotments satisfying individual rationality and e¢ ciency.
(P5.4) Consider the rule f that, for each 2 P and each i 2 N; fi () = bi, where bi
is dened as in (11): It is immediate to see that f is individually rational and strategy-
proof. 
Example 2 below shows that the rules fCEL and fCEA are not e¢ cient on the larger
domain of single-peaked preferences.
Example 2 Consider the problem (N;) 2 P whereN = f1; 2; 3g and p = (0:15; 0:5; 0:65) :
Thus, fCEL(N;) = (0:05; 0:4; 0:55) and fCEA(N;) = (0:15; 0:275; 0:575) : If we take
y = (0:15; 0:9; 0:95) and  such that 0:9 2 0:4 and 0:95 3 0:575 we have that fCEL
and fCEA are not e¢ cient. 
6.2 Other rules
In the classical division problem, where a xed amount of the good has to be allotted, the
uniform rule emerges as the one that satises many desirable properties. For instance,
Sprumont (1991) shows that it is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency
and anonymity. Sprumont (1991) also shows that in this characterization anonymity
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can be replaced by non-envyness and Ching (1994) shows that in fact anonymity can
be replaced by the weaker requirement of equal treatment of equals. Sönmez (1994)
shows that the uniform rule is the unique one satisfying consistency, monotonicity and
individual rationality from equal division. Thomson (1994a, 1994b, 1995 and 1997)
contains alternative characterizations of the uniform rule using the properties of one
sided resource-monotonicity, converse consistency, weak population-monotonicity and
replication invariance, respectively. On the other hand, if one is concerned mostly with
incentives and e¢ ciency issues (and leaves aside any equity principle), sequential dicta-
tor rules emerge as natural ways of solving the classical division problem, since they are
strategy-proof and e¢ cient. However, we briey argue below that the natural adapta-
tions of all these rules to our setting with endogenous integer units of the good are far
from being desirable since they are neither individually rational nor strategy-proof.
6.2.1 Uniform rule
We adapt the uniform rule by selecting the e¢ cient number of integer units (using our
tie-breaking criterion that selects the smallest one whenever there are two of them) and
allotting this amount using the uniform rule.
Extended uniform (fEU). For all 2 P and i 2 N , set
fEUi () =
(
min fpi; g if
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj]
max fpi; g if
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj];
where  is the unique real number for which
P
j2N f
EU
j () = [
P
j2N pj] holds.
Proposition 6 The extended uniform rule fEU is e¢ cient on P (and hence on PS)
but it is neither individually rational nor strategy-proof on PS (and hence, on P).
Proof The same argument used to prove (P5.2) on P shows that fEU is e¢ cient on P
(and hence on PS). To see that fEU is neither individually rational nor strategy-proof on
PS consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where N = f1; 2; 3g and p = (0:2; 0:2; 0:9) : Then
fEU () = (0:2; 0:2; 0:6) : Since agent 3 strictly prefers 1 to 0:6, fEU is not individually
rational. To see that fEU is not strategy-proof consider the symmetric single-peaked
preference 03 with p03 = 1:12: Then, fEU (03; 3) = (0:44; 0:44; 1:12) : Since 3 strictly
prefers (according to 3) 1:12 to 0:6, agent 3 manipulates fEU at prole  via 03 : 
Following Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2015) we could also adapt the uniform
rule (denoted by fCEU) to this setting by making sure that allotments are individually
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rational as follows: for all 2 PS and i 2 N;
fCEUi () =
(
minfpi;maxfli; gg if
P
j2N pj  [
P
j2N pj]
maxfpi;minfui; gg if
P
j2N pj < [
P
j2N pj];
where  is the unique real number for which
P
j2N fj() = [
P
j2N pj]: In contrast to
Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2015), the rule fCEU is not strategy-proof in this new
setting. Nevertheless, it is still appealing, because it belongs to the class of individually
rational and e¢ cient rules, and moreover, it satises equal treatment of equals.
6.2.2 Sequential dictator
We adapt the sequential dictator rule to the setting where the integer number of units
to be allotted is endogenous. Fix an ordering on the set of agents and let them select
sequentially, following the ordering, the amount they want (their peak) among the set
of all e¢ cient allocations. Formally, let  : N ! f1; : : : ; ng be a one-to-one mapping
dening an ordering on the set of agents N ; namely, for i; j 2 N , (i) < (j) means that
i goes before j in the ordering :
Sequential dictator at  (fSD). For all 2 PS and i 2 N , set
fSDi () =
8>>>><>>>>:
minfpi;maxf[
P
k2N
pk] 
P
fj02Sj(j0)<(i)g
pj0 ; 0gg if (i) < (j) for some j
maxf[P
k2N
pk] 
P
fj02Sj(j0)<(i)g
pj0 ; 0g otherwise.
Proposition 7 The sequential dictator rule fSD at any ordering  is e¢ cient on PS
but it is neither individually rational nor strategy-proof on PS.
Proof The fact that, for any xed ordering , fSD is e¢ cient on P follows imme-
diately from its denition and (P5.2) in Proposition 5. To see that fSD is neither
individually rational nor strategy-proof on PS consider the problem (N;) 2 PS where
N = f1; 2g and p = (0:26; 0:26):Without loss of generality, let (i) = i for i = 1; 2: Then,
fSD () = (0:26; 0:74). Since bu2 = 0:52; fSD is not individually rational. Moreover,
since fSD(1;02) = (0; 0); where p02 = 0; agent 2 manipulates fSD at prole  via
02 : Hence, fSD is not strategy-proof. 
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